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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, Constanza Ihnen applies the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation to 
the example of Second Reading debates in British Parliament. Her paper shows well the 
usefulness and applicability of the pragma-dialectical method of analysis in such cases 
and thus achieves its central aim. Because I am in fundamental agreement with Ihnen on 
this score, these comments will be brief and will be focused only in two areas. First, I 
shall address a few remarks to the distinction between principles and details. Secondly, I 
will take up Ihnen’s normative model of the government’s argumentation, and in 
particular the question of whether some alternative modes of modeling the argumentation 
might not perhaps have been better alternatives than Ihnen suggests. Finally, I will close 
my comments by noting what I think are some possible benefits of further work on 
argumentation structures within Second Reading debates. 
 
2. PRINCIPLES AND DETAILS IN SECOND READING DEBATES 
 
One of the signature features of Second Reading debates as described by Ihnen is that in 
such debates MPs are to discuss the principles of the bill before them, and not the details. 
The principles of a bill include, according to Ihnen, three kinds of propositions. They 
include those propositions that (1) “appear in the “short title” of the face of the published 
copy,” (2) that are explicitly designated as such on the UK Parliament’s website, and (3) 
that describe “the main policy objectives” of the bill. The details, one gathers from 
Ihnen’s account, comprise such things as the specific wording of its clauses, specific 
practical considerations about how best to realize the principles of the bill, and other such 
things as are necessary for the drafting of law. In terms of the process Ihnen outlines, 
principles are deliberated upon first in Second Reading debates, and then settlement of 
the details are taken up by a Committee tasked to the job. 
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As Ihnen is careful to point out, it isn’t always a simple matter to make the 
distinction between principles and details in Second Reading debates, as the 
determination of what counts as belonging to either class of proposition is at least partly 
the result of the argumentation taking place in the Second Reading debate itself. This is 
plausible, as it would be reasonable to expect the positions of at least some MPs with 
respect to the principles of the bill to be driven by considerations of what means will be 
chosen, or are likely to be chosen, to realize those principles in the subsequent Committee 
stage of the law-making process. I am sure Ihnen is right when she says that whether a 
consideration is one of principle or one of detail “is not always a black and white matter.” 
After all, Ihnen’s sources are the House of Commons Information Office and MP’s: 
persons who, themselves, are regular parties to the argumentation in Second Reading 
debates. In the absence of any provision in the Parliamentary procedures addressed to the 
difference or of a larger body of empirical data from which to extrapolate, it’s hard to see 
where else one might look for clues to the distinction. That said, I think the importance of 
the distinction in making sense of the argumentation at issue warrants a slightly more 
aggressively constructive interpretation on the part of the analyst. There are a couple  of 
reasons why.  
First, the distinction is very important, feeding in as it does to other (normative) 
aspects of the analysis here. The distinction between principles and details seems 
important for assessing the contributions of antagonists, and for making judgments of 
relevance as regard the contributions of both parties. It is evident, in any case, that the 
distinction between principles and details is crucial to any analysis of Second Reading 
debates—perhaps even to any pragma-dialectical analysis of British lawmaking in 
general. Thus we can say that the importance of the distinction warrants the analyst’s 
effort to state it in the clearest possible terms. 
Secondly, the MP’s reports may contain some unwitting distortion, since their 
reports of what happens in Second Reading debates might be coloured by a desire to 
appear to be “reasonable” or flexible in their thinking. It may also be that, as participants, 
the MP’s views of what happens in Second Reading debates lack a sort of clinical 
detachment that could be useful in assessing what really happens, in assessing how the 
distinction between principle and details is actually deployed in argumentation. The 
House of Commons Information Office, having less of a public persona to maintain, is 
perhaps more neutral and therefore more reliable, but what it says, alone, seems 
insufficient to really explain the distinction if things are so fluid in actual practice. This is 
not to say that the MPs and the House of Commons Information Office aren’t good 
sources. They are good sources. My question is only whether there might not be more 
and better places to look to see if the initial account of principles and details gleaned from 
them is borne out in practice—perhaps as revealed through examination of records of 
Second Reading debates. Of course this is a great deal more than can be expected in a 
paper of this length, and that is why I said in the beginning that it is only a 
recommendation for further research, a suggestion for further building on the work that 
Ihnen has done here. 
  
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENTATION 
 
Among the many virtues of Ihnen’s analysis is its clarity, but there is one area where I 
would ask Ihnen for just a little more detail, and that is in her specification of the 
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structure of the government’s argumentation. According to her analysis, the 
government’s case basically is an argument of the form modus ponens at the highest 
level, with sublevels devoted to the supporting arguments for each premise. This, I think, 
is fine. My question is addressed to the structure of her model two levels down from the 
level of the main premise—1.1.1a (which deals with the desirability of the overall 
purpose of the bill) and 1.1.1b (which deals with the desirability of the purposes of each 
of the bill’s clauses). Ihnen describes the relationship between these premises as 
coordinative in their support for premise 1.1 (that the principle of the bill is acceptable). 
Figure 1 represents Ihnen’s proposal (with levels of detail below the third omitted for 
clarity in the diagram). 
 
Figure 11 
 
 
 
In making her case for this interpretation of the argumentation structure, Ihnen explicitly 
rules out two natural alternative possibilities:  1) that the structure is multiple and 2) that 
the structure is subordinative. I am not sure either of these alternatives are as easy to rule 
out as she suggests, but in the interest of brevity I will confine my remarks to the 
alternative possibility of multiple argument structure (figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 All figures in these comments were generated with Araucaria 3.1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
Ihnen rejects the possibility that the argument is multiple in structure because “the fact 
that the overall purpose of the Bill is desirable is not sufficient reason to accept that the 
Bill should be read a second time.” (p. 9) As is evident in her discussion of the nature of 
the dispute in Second Readings on page 7, argumentation premise 1.1.1b clearly falls 
within the scope of the second proposition (p2) at issue, namely that the details of the bill 
are acceptable. The first proposition (p1), recall, was that the Bill should be read a second 
time. The problem for Ihnen’s rejection of multiple argument structure lies in her 
admission that “a party can perfectly assume a positive standpoint towards p1 while 
assuming a negative standpoint towards p2. The official position assumed by the 
Conservative party during the debate is an illustration of this.” (p. 7) If this is the case 
then a dilemma seems to result: either the desirability of the overall purpose of the Bill is 
sufficient reason to accept that the Bill should be read again, or we must conclude that 
something is amiss with the Conservative party’s position, i.e. that it isn’t (or at least 
shouldn’t be) acceptable to endorse p1 but not p2. This apparent dilemma, I think, shows 
at least that though Ihnen’s preference for interpreting the argumentation structure as 
coordinative is understandable, more needs to be done to rule out alternative 
interpretations. This challenge, like that mentioned earlier regarding the distinction 
between principle and detail, is one that I believe can probably be met with further 
empirical research into how these arguments are given in the course of actual Second 
Reading debates. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Constanza Ihnen’s paper does a good job in laying the ground for a pragma-dialectical 
analysis of Second Reading debates. Like any good opening volley it raises questions 
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about the subject matter and marks areas of interest for further discussion and 
investigation. The most promising to my lights is the distinction between principles and 
details, as those terms are understood in Second Reading debates. My hunch is that 
further investigation into the distinction between principles and details would be 
revealing. Certainly it would contribute to our understanding of the processes by which 
MPs use argumentation to shift propositions into or out of either category in these 
debates, for one thing. More broadly, insights of this sort might prove useful in 
understanding less institutionally governed varieties of argumentation about means and 
ends too, since there seems to be an analogical relationship between principles in Second 
Reading debates, and “ends” of the prudential or moral sort and between the details that 
ostensibly are bracketed in Second Reading and the “means” we consider in prudential or 
moral contexts. It would be interesting were such investigation to reveal that the priority 
we typically assign to “ends” over “means”—a priority that seems implicit in the 
Parliamentary process described by Ihnen and in much of our moral (and political) 
thinking—turned out often to be out of step with our ordinary dialectical practices in 
arguing over which actions to take. So I think there’s much to be gained by further work 
here. 
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